Bidding for subsidies with one's patience
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More about this item
Keywords
Subsidies; Market Design; Auctions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2025-04-28 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2025-04-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2025-04-28 (Microeconomics)
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