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Concrete shoes for competition: The effect of the German cement cartel on market price

Author

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  • Hüschelrath, Kai
  • Müller, Kathrin
  • Veith, Tobias

Abstract

We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartelinduced price increase. We apply two different comparator-based approaches - the 'before and-after' approach and the 'difference-in-differences' approach - and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period on the overcharge estimate. We find that the cement cartel led to price overcharges in a range from 20.3 to 26.5 percent depending on model approach and model assumptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hüschelrath, Kai & Müller, Kathrin & Veith, Tobias, 2012. "Concrete shoes for competition: The effect of the German cement cartel on market price," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-035, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12035
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James F. Nieberding, 2006. "Estimating overcharges in antitrust cases using a reduced-form approach: Methods and issues," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 9, pages 361-380, November.
    2. repec:oup:jcomle:v:6:y:2010:i:3:p:595-618. is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Joseph E. Harrington, 2004. "Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 517-533, December.
    4. Hans W. Friederiszick & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2010. "Quantification of harm in damages actions for antitrust infringements: Insights from German cartel cases," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-10-001, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. F. Maier-Rigaud & R. Inderst & U. Schwalbe, 2013. "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," Post-Print hal-00845779, HAL.
    2. Kai Hüschelrath & Kathrin Müller & Tobias Veith, 2016. "Estimating damages from price-fixing: the value of transaction data," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 509-535, June.
    3. H. Peter Boswijk & Maurice J.G. Bun & Maarten Pieter Schinkel, 2016. "Cartel Dating," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-092/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Odenkirchen, Johannes, 2017. "Pricing Behavior of Cartel Outsiders in Incomplete Cartels," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168309, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Frank Maier-Rigaud & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2013. "Quantification of Antitrust Damages," Working Papers 2013-ECO-09, IESEG School of Management.
    6. Fink, Nikolaus & Frübing, Stefan, 2015. "Legal and illegal cartels in the European cement industry," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-066, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    7. Doose, Anna Maria, 2013. "Methods for calculating cartel damages: A survey," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 83, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    8. Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2015. "How Much Do Cartel Overcharge? (The "Working Paper" Version)," CIRANO Working Papers 2015s-37, CIRANO.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust policy; cartels; private enforcement; damages; overcharge;

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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