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Maastricht als Herausforderung und Chance: Die Auswirkungen der europäischen Integration auf den italienischen Wohlfahrtsstaat

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  • Gohr, Antonia

Abstract

Das Papier fragt nach den Auswirkungen der europäischen Integration auf den nationalen Wohlfahrtsstaat am Beispiel der italienischen Sozialpolitik seit 1992. Der italienische Wohlfahrtsstaat hat in den 90er Jahren einschneidende Reformen erfahren. Neben den vielen internen Herausforderungen erhöhten insbesondere die im Maastrichter Vertrag vereinbarten wirtschaftspolitischen Zielgrößen den politisch-ökonomischen Problemdruck auf den Sozialstaat. Die 1990er Jahre bieten sich daher für eine Untersuchung besonders an. Die Maastrichter Konvergenzkriterien stellten für die italienische Sozialpolitik einerseits Zwänge dar, andererseits ermöglichten sie aber in dem fragmentierten Parteiensystem Italiens Reformen, die zuvor an der Schwäche und Kurzlebigkeit zahlreicher Vielparteienregierungen gescheitert waren. Die europäische Integration wirkte damit gleichsam als 'Modernisierungspeitsche'. Ergänzt und verstärkt wurde dieser externe Druck durch interne Ereignisse, wie den Zusammenbruch des Parteiensystems und das Erscheinen neuer politischer Akteure. Die internationalen Einflußfaktoren sollen daher auf Wechselwirkungen mit innenpolitischen Determinanten der Sozialstaatstätigkeit untersucht werden. Zwar konzentriert sich diese Untersuchung auf den italienischen Wohlfahrtsstaat. Sie zielt jedoch auch darauf ab, zum Verständnis der Faktoren und Umstände der Auswirkungen der europäischen Integration auf nationale Wohlfahrtsstaaten allgemein einen Beitrag zu leisten.

Suggested Citation

  • Gohr, Antonia, 2001. "Maastricht als Herausforderung und Chance: Die Auswirkungen der europäischen Integration auf den italienischen Wohlfahrtsstaat," Working papers of the ZeS 08/2001, University of Bremen, Centre for Social Policy Research (ZeS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zeswps:082001
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    1. Weaver, R. Kent, 1986. "The Politics of Blame Avoidance," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 371-398, October.
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    2. Sommer, Jörg, 2007. "The open method of co-ordination: Some remarks regarding old-age security within an enlarged European Union," Working papers of the ZeS 02/2003, University of Bremen, Centre for Social Policy Research (ZeS).

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