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Budget structure and reelection prospects: Empirical evidence from French local elections

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  • Cassette, Aurélie
  • Farvaque, Etienne
  • Héricourt, Jérôme
  • Jean, Nicolas

Abstract

This paper is a study of the influence of economic and political conditions on the results of incumbent parties' candidates in local elections in France. The large sample used covers 586 towns and two elections (2001 and 2008). It explicitly deals with the specificities induced by the tworound process of the French electoral rule, and results are provided for both the reelection probability and the share of votes. It is shown that the budget structure, and notably equipment expenditures, has a strong impact on the incumbent party's share of votes. Political variables also play a role, as do the number of candidates, and national partisan waves.

Suggested Citation

  • Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne & Héricourt, Jérôme & Jean, Nicolas, 2009. "Budget structure and reelection prospects: Empirical evidence from French local elections," ZEI Working Papers B 02-2009, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:b022009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477, Decembrie.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local elections; Visible expenditures;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories

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