Standortwettbewerb der Bundesländer
Germany`s disappointing economic performance causes political upsets. If the next government intents to be more successfull than the current one, fundamental reforms are to be enforced. Germany`s inadequate federal system is a major growth obstacle. The country forgoes the benefits of institutional competition, that would result in a higher level of efficiency. As mobility within the federal republic is higher than between countries, competition among the German Länder could be more challenging than between Germany and its foreign trade partners. Thus, vivid competition on the level of the Länder would strengthen the incentives to perform an effective policy and wipe out inefficiencies, for example those being due to the political process. Though the most important political issues are shaped on the federal level, some political scope for the Länder governments remains. This holds true especially as far as the administration rather than the legislative is concerned. The study ?Die Bundesländer im Standortwettbewerb? evaluates the political success of the German Länder. It reveals, that the different performance of the Länder is also due to different Länder policies. Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg are the two most successful Flächenländer (non-city states), and they are the two Länder with the most consequent policies as well. To enhence the beneficial effects of institutional competition, a comprehensive reform has to widen the political scope of the Länder. Competences are to be disentengled. With the concept of the FOCJ (functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions), Frey an Eichenberger propose to decentralize competences radically and enhence institutional competition to a maximum level.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (0931) 31-2901
Fax: (0931) 31-2101
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-wuerzburg.de/lehrstuehle/vwl4/startseite/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Huber, Bernd & Lichtblau, Karl, 1998. "Konfiskatorischer Finanzausgleich verlangt eine Reform," Munich Reprints in Economics 19398, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Robert Kaestner & Neeraj Kaushal & Gregg Van Ryzin, 2001.
"Migration Consequences of Welfare Reform,"
NBER Working Papers
8560, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Berthold, Norbert, 1997. "Der Sozialstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung," Beiträge zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 127, number urn:isbn:9783161468513, November.
- Edward M. Gramlich & Deborah S. Laren, 1984. "Migration and Income Redistribution Responsibilities," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 19(4), pages 489-511.
- Pauly, Mark V., 1973. "Income redistribution as a local public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, February.
- Sinn, Stefan, 1992. "Saving-Investment Correlations and Capital Mobility: On the Evidence from Annual Data," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1162-70, September.
- Huber, Bernd & Lichtblau, Karl, 1998. "Konfiskatorischer Finanzausgleich verlangt eine Reform," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1998 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 78(3), pages 142-147.
- Herbert Giersch, 1989. "Anmerkungen zum weltwirtschaftlichen denkansatz," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 1-16, March.
- Siebert, Horst, 2000. "The paradigm of locational competition," Kiel Discussion Papers 367, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Siebert, Horst & Koop, Michael J, 1993. "Institutional Competition versus Centralization: Quo Vadis Europe?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 15-30, Spring.
- Siebert, Horst, 1996. "On the concept of locational competition," Kiel Working Papers 731, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Bayoumi, Tamim A. & Rose, Andrew K., 1993. "Domestic savings and intra-national capital flows," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1197-1202, August.
- Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, 1979.
"Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows,"
NBER Working Papers
0310, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Siebert, Horst & Koop, Michael J., 1993. "Institutional competition versus centralization: Quo vadis Europe?," Kiel Working Papers 548, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 315-327, September.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 1999. "Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 505-525, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wuewwb:80. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.