Discharge of residual debt: Do private and institutional lenders differ?
With the help of lab experiments we study the impact of discharging insolvent debtors of their residual debt. We investigate the impact of different participation rules and the impact of different types of lenders. We find that higher participation rates encourage risk taking behaviour of borrowers. Higher participation rates also reduce the amount of moonlighting. Most importantly, institutional lenders can suffer more from moonlighting than private lenders.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.socialpolitik.org/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mohnen, Alwine & Pokorny, Kathrin & Sliwka, Dirk, 2008.
"Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3281, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Alwine Mohnen & Kathrin Pokorny & Dirk Sliwka, 2008. "Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(4), pages 693-720, October.
- Daniel Houser & Daniel Schunk & Joachim Winter & Erte Xiao, 2010. "Temptation and commitment in the laboratory," IEW - Working Papers 488, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79851. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.