When to regulate airports: A simple rule
Landing fees at airports are regulated almost all over the world since airports are assumed to abuse their market power. We find that monopolistic airports have an incentive to restrain landing fees when they generate additional non-aviation revenues and that the optimal landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, we show that monopolistic airports will not have an incentive to abuse their market power anymore so that a price regulation becomes inappropriate as soon as non-aviation revenues increase above 50% of all airport revenues.
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- Sieg, Gernot, 2010.
"Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots,"
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological,
Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 29-37, January.
- Sieg, Gernot, 2009. "Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots," Economics Department Working Paper Series 4, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
- Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot, 2009. "When to regulate airports: A simple rule," Economics Department Working Paper Series 6, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
- Marc Gürtler & Gernot Sieg, 2010.
"Crunch Time: A Policy to Avoid the 'Announcement Effect' when Terminating a Subsidy,"
German Economic Review,
Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11, pages 25-36, 02.
- Gürtler, Marc & Sieg, Gernot, 2006. "Crunch time: The optimal policy to avoid the "Announcement Effect" when terminating a subsidy," Working Papers FW24V2, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institute of Finance.
- Gürtler, Marc & Sieg, Gernot, 2008. "Crunch time: A policy to avoid the announcement effect when terminating a subsidy," Economics Department Working Paper Series 1, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
- Sieg, Gernot & Stegemann, Ulrike, 2009.
"Strategic debt management within the stability and growth pact,"
Economics Department Working Paper Series
5, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
- Gernot Sieg & Ulrike Stegemann, 2010. "Strategic Debt Management within the Stability and Growth Pact," Review of Economics, Lucius & Lucius, vol. 61(3), pages 225-240.
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