IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/safewp/239.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Leverage and Bubbles: Experimental Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Gortner, Paul
  • Massenot, Baptiste

Abstract

We investigate the effect of leverage on bubbles in an asset market experiment. We expect higher leverage to produce larger bubbles because (i) it creates moral hazard in a setup with limited liability and (ii) it increases aggregate liquidity. Inconsistent with the moral hazard channel, which we test by holding aggregate liquidity constant, higher leverage does not produce larger bubbles. To understand this unexpected result, we run the same experiment with a different framing: instead of repaying debt, participants can earn a bonus. This bonus treatment produces larger bubbles, suggesting that more leveraged participants trade more cautiously to avoid default. Finally, bubbles are larger and increase over time when we keep leverage constant over time by injecting liquidity in the economy. Overall, these results suggest that higher leverage inflates bubbles not because of moral hazard but because of more abundant liquidity.

Suggested Citation

  • Gortner, Paul & Massenot, Baptiste, 2020. "Leverage and Bubbles: Experimental Evidence," SAFE Working Paper Series 239, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2020.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:239
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3311378
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/213831/1/SAFE-WP-239_20200210.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2139/ssrn.3311378?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lucy F. Ackert & Narat Charupat & Bryan K. Church & Richard Deaves, 2006. "Margin, Short Selling, And Lotteries In Experimental Asset Markets," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(2), pages 419-436, October.
    2. Grill, Michael & Lang, Jan Hannes & Smith, Jonathan, 2015. "The Impact of the Basel III Leverage Ratio on Risk-Taking and Bank Stability," Financial Stability Review, European Central Bank, vol. 2.
    3. Thomas Meissner, 2016. "Intertemporal consumption and debt aversion: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 281-298, June.
    4. Tibor Neugebauer & Sascha Füllbrunn, 2013. "Deflating Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Comparative Statics of Margin Regulations," LSF Research Working Paper Series 13-14, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    5. Koehn, Michael & Santomero, Anthony M, 1980. "Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(5), pages 1235-1244, December.
    6. Gabriel Jiménez & Steven Ongena & José-Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2017. "Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers, and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(6), pages 2126-2177.
    7. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    8. Uri Gneezy & Jan Potters, 1997. "An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 631-645.
    9. R. Mark Isaac & Duncan James, 2003. "Boundaries of the Tournament Pricing Effect in Asset Markets: Evidence from Experimental Markets," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 69(4), pages 936-951, April.
    10. Sascha Füllbrunn & Tibor Neugebauer, 2013. "Limited Liability, Moral Hazard, And Risk Taking: A Safety Net Game Experiment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1389-1403, April.
    11. Holmen, Martin & Kirchler, Michael & Kleinlercher, Daniel, 2014. "Do option-like incentives induce overvaluation? Evidence from experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 179-194.
    12. VanHoose, David, 2007. "Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3680-3697, December.
    13. Baghestanian, Sascha & Gortner, Paul & Massenot, Baptiste, 2015. "Compensation schemes, liquidity provision, and asset prices: An experimental analysis," SAFE Working Paper Series 108, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    14. R. Mark Isaac & Duncan James, 2000. "Asset Markets: How They Are Affected by Tournament Incentives for Individuals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 995-1004, September.
    15. Rime, Bertrand, 2001. "Capital requirements and bank behaviour: Empirical evidence for Switzerland," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 789-805, April.
    16. Blum, Jurg, 1999. "Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 755-771, May.
    17. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1992. "Capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1137-1170, June.
    18. Samuel G. Hanson & Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    19. Fischbacher, Urs & Hens, Thorsten & Zeisberger, Stefan, 2013. "The impact of monetary policy on stock market bubbles and trading behavior: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 2104-2122.
    20. Marco Cipriani & Ana Fostel & Daniel Houser, 2018. "Collateral Constraints and the Law of One Price: An Experiment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(6), pages 2757-2786, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Coppock, Lee A. & Harper, Daniel Q. & Holt, Charles A., 2021. "Capital constraints and asset bubbles: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 75-88.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Moreira, Fernando, 2022. "Are we living in an illusion? A fresh look at the importance of bank capital in the quest for stability," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    2. Affinito, Massimiliano & Tagliaferri, Edoardo, 2010. "Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 189-202, December.
    3. Andreas Barth & Christian Seckinger, 2013. "Capital Regulation with Heterogeneous Banks," Working Papers 1310, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 19 Dec 2013.
    4. Saadaoui, Zied, 2008. "Capital standards and banking stability in emerging countries: an empirical approach," MPRA Paper 25464, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Barth, Andreas & Seckinger, Christian, 2018. "Capital regulation with heterogeneous banks – Unintended consequences of a too strict leverage ratio," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 455-465.
    6. Jokipii, Terhi & Milne, Alistair, 2011. "Bank capital buffer and risk adjustment decisions," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 165-178, August.
    7. Debapriya Jojo Paul & Julia Henker & Sian Owen, 2019. "The aggregate impacts of tournament incentives in experimental asset markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 441-476, June.
    8. Hussein, Kassim, 2010. "Bank level stability factors and consumer confidence – a comparative study of Islamic and conventional banks’ product mix," MPRA Paper 21800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Fenig, Guidon & Mileva, Mariya & Petersen, Luba, 2018. "Deflating asset price bubbles with leverage constraints and monetary policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 1-27.
    10. Dautović, Ernest, 2019. "Has regulatory capital made banks safer? Skin in the game vs moral hazard," ESRB Working Paper Series 91, European Systemic Risk Board.
    11. Christian Hott, 2022. "Leverage and Risk Taking under Moral Hazard," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 167-185, April.
    12. Andreas Haufler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2022. "Voluntary Equity, Project Risk, and Capital Requirements," CESifo Working Paper Series 9505, CESifo.
    13. G. Dionne & T. M. Harchaoui, 2002. "Banks’ Capital, Securitization and Credit Risk : An Empirical Evidence for Canada," THEMA Working Papers 2002-33, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    14. Barrios, Victor E. & Blanco, Juan M., 2003. "The effectiveness of bank capital adequacy regulation: A theoretical and empirical approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 1935-1958, October.
    15. Retselisitsoe I. Thamae & Nicholas M. Odhiambo, 2022. "The impact of bank regulation on bank lending: a review of international literature," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(4), pages 405-418, December.
    16. Zhengyang Bao & Kenan Kalayci & Andreas Leibbrandt & Carlos Oyarzun, 2019. "Regulating Bubbles Away?Experiment-Based Evidence of Price Limits and Trading Restrictions in Asset Markets with Deterministic and Stochastic Fundamental Values," Monash Economics Working Papers 14-18, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    17. Kai Ding & Enoch Hill & David Perez-Reyna, 2021. "Optimal capital requirements with noisy signals on banking risk," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1649-1687, June.
    18. David VanHoose, 2006. "Bank Behavior Under Capital Regulation: What Does The Academic Literature Tell Us?," NFI Working Papers 2006-WP-04, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    19. Donsyah Yudistira, 2002. "The Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Indonesia," Finance 0212002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 May 2003.
    20. Stephen L. Cheung & Andrew Coleman, 2014. "Relative Performance Incentives and Price Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 345-363, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:239. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csafede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.