Limited Liability, Moral Hazard and Risk Taking - A Safety Net Game Experiment
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Sascha Füllbrunn & Tibor Neugebauer, 2013. "Limited Liability, Moral Hazard, And Risk Taking: A Safety Net Game Experiment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1389-1403, April.
- Tibor Neugebauer, & Sascha Fullbrunn, 2012. "Limited Liability, Moral Hazard and Risk Taking A Safety Net Game Experiment," LSF Research Working Paper Series 12-12, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
References listed on IDEAS
- Di Mauro, Carmela, 2002. "Ex ante and ex post moral hazard in compensation for income losses: results from an experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 253-271.
More about this item
KeywordsExperiment; social safety net; moral hazard; linear public goods game; hidden action;
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-07-10 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2010-07-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2010-07-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-07-10 (Public Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crf:wpaper:10-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martine Zenner). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsculu.html .