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Stabiles Geld - eine Illusion? Alternative Währungssysteme - Hayeks Fundamentalkritik - Unabhängigkeit der Notenbanken

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  • Issing, Otmar

Abstract

Der Beitrag analysiert die Voraussetzungen für stabiles Geld und setzt sich dabei grundlegend mit Hayeks Thesen zu alternativen Währungssystemen sowie dessen fundamentaler Kritik an der Möglichkeit zur Gestaltung der Geldpolitik auf wissenschaftlicher Basis auseinander. Er prüft Hayeks Vorschlag zur Entnationalisierung des Geldes und seine Thesen zur Überlegenheit des im privaten Wettbewerb geschaffenen Geldes. In diesem Zusammenhang schlägt der Beitrag einen Bogen zur aktuellen Diskussion über Kryptowährungen und wirft die Frage auf, ob virtuelle Währungen wie etwa Bitcoin geeignet sind, den Hayekschen Währungswettbewerb zu entfalten. Sodann wird im Gegensatz zu Hayeks Forderung nach einer Abschaffung der Zentralbanken deren entscheidende Rolle für anhaltendes Wachstum bei stabilen Preisen skizziert und die Wichtigkeit der Unabhängigkeit von Notenbanken für die dauerhafte Durchführung einer stabilitätsorientierten Geldpolitik hervorgehoben. Gleichwohl ergeht der Hinweis, dass Notenbanken mit der Überschreitung ihres Mandats auf lange Sicht gesehen selbst den Status ihrer Unabhängigkeit unterminieren können und damit die Rückübertragung der Kompetenz für zentrale geldpolitische Entscheidungen auf Regierung und Parlament provozieren. Die Gefahren der weitgehenden Unabhängigkeit einiger weniger an der Spitze der Notenbanken anerkennend wird anschließend die Bedeutung ihrer Rechenschaftspflicht und Transparenz ihrer Entscheidungen unterstrichen.

Suggested Citation

  • Issing, Otmar, 2018. "Stabiles Geld - eine Illusion? Alternative Währungssysteme - Hayeks Fundamentalkritik - Unabhängigkeit der Notenbanken," SAFE White Paper Series 52, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:52
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Geldpolitik; Hayek; Kryptowährungen; Unabhängigkeit; Währungswettbewerb; Zentralbanken;

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