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Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value

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  • Casajus, André

Abstract

We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by them are equivalent. Combined with the dummy player axiom, any of the collusion properties has strong symmetry implications whenever the cardinality of the player set exceeds two. Finally, we establish that the Banzhaf value is non-redundantly characterized by the dummy player axiom and any of the collusion properties, provided that the player set is as above.

Suggested Citation

  • Casajus, André, 2011. "Collusion, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value," Working Papers 99, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:leiwps:99
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    1. Bretschger, Lucas & Steger, Thomas, 2013. "Globalization, The Volatility Of Intermediate Goods Prices, And Economic Growth," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, pages 402-430.
    2. Ronald Ian McKinnon & Gunther Schnabl, 2008. "China’s Exchange Rate Impasse and the Weak U.S. Dollar," CESifo Working Paper Series 2386, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Schäfer, Andreas & Schneider, Maik T., 2015. "Endogenous Enforcement Of Intellectual Property, North–South Trade, And Growth," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, pages 1074-1115.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banzhaf value; symmetry; collusion; proxy; association; distrust;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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