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Klinikentgelte in den Bundesländern: Kostengerecht oder wettbewerbsverzerrend?

Author

Listed:
  • Benček, David
  • Klodt, Henning

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag geht der Frage nach, ob die unterschiedlich hohen Landesbasisfallwerte für Kliniken in Deutschland durch systematische Kostenunterschiede zwischen den Bundesländern zu erklären sind. Die statistische Analyse kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass einzig krankenhausspezifische und strukturelle Merkmale der Regionen und nicht die gegenwärtige Kostenstruktur der Kliniken ansatzweise die Varianz in den Landesbasisfallwerten erklären können. Mehr als drei Viertel der Unterschiede gehen auf nicht gemessene Faktoren zurück oder sind gar willkürlicher Natur. Nach der ökonomischen Theorie anreizeffizienter Regulierung erscheint eine Fortsetzung des Konvergenzprozesses der Basisfallwerte hin zu einer bundeseinheitlichen Pauschale sinnvoll.

Suggested Citation

  • Benček, David & Klodt, Henning, 2017. "Klinikentgelte in den Bundesländern: Kostengerecht oder wettbewerbsverzerrend?," Kieler Beiträge zur Wirtschaftspolitik 10, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkbw:10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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