Environmental taxes in the long run
The efficiency of the Pigouvian tax suggests that price-based regulation is the proper benchmark for efficient regulation. However, results due to Carlton and Loury (1980, 1986) question this; when harm depends on scale effects a pure Pigou tax is inefficient regulation in the long run. In this note we make precise that there is an efficient tax scheme for controlling harm as long as social optimum exists. In particular, the efficient tax scheme is based on a tax rate equal to marginal harm. Hence, price regulation is the right benchmark for regulation even in the presence of scale effects in the harm function.
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- Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
- Kazuhiko Kato, 2011. "Emission quota versus emission tax in a mixed duopoly," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies- The Official Journal of the Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies / The Official Journal of the East Asian Association of Environmental and, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(1), pages 43-63, January.
- Baumol, William J, 1979. "Quasi Optimality: The Price We Must Pay for a Price System," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(3), pages 578-99, June.
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