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Funktionale Unternehmensbewertung im Lichte der Vertragstheorie

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  • Matschke, Xenia

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  • Matschke, Xenia, 2008. "Funktionale Unternehmensbewertung im Lichte der Vertragstheorie," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 04/2008, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:grewdp:042008
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32339/1/590408097.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matschke Manfred Jürgen & Brösel Gerrit & Matschke Xenia, 2010. "Fundamentals of Functional Business Valuation," Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-41, November.
    2. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    3. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
    4. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    5. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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