IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/gigawp/21.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Paradox of Plenty? Rent Distribution and Political Stability in Oil States

Author

Listed:
  • Basedau, Matthias
  • Lacher, Wolfram

Abstract

Resource curse theory claims that resource abundance encourages violent conflict. A study of 37 oil-producing developing countries, however, reveals that oil states with very high levels of oil revenue are remarkably stable. An analysis of the ways in which governments spend oil revenues identifies two distinct types of rentier systems - the large-scale distributive state and the patronage-based system - which are strongly linked to instability or its absence. However, some deviant cases, such as Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, illustrate the need for further research. Apparently, the notion of a 'paradox of plenty' has neglected rentier mechanisms that avoid conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Basedau, Matthias & Lacher, Wolfram, 2006. "A Paradox of Plenty? Rent Distribution and Political Stability in Oil States," GIGA Working Papers 21, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gigawp:21
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/47851/1/605209502.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Macartan Humphreys, 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(4), pages 508-537, August.
    2. Benjamin Smith, 2004. "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 232-246, April.
    3. Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, 2003. "Natural Resources and Violent Conflict : Options and Actions," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15047, December.
    4. Paul Collier & V. L. Elliott & Håvard Hegre & Anke Hoeffler & Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis, 2003. "Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13938, December.
    5. James D. Fearon, 2005. "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(4), pages 483-507, August.
    6. Christopher Cramer, 2003. "Does inequality cause conflict?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 397-412.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lotfali Agheli, 2017. "Political Stability, Misery Index and Institutional Quality: Case Study of Middle East and North Africa," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 30-46.
    2. Mähler, Annegret, 2009. "Oil in Venezuela: Triggering Violence or Ensuring Stability? A Context-sensitive Analysis of the Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance," GIGA Working Papers 112, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    3. Jayakar, Krishna & Martin, Brandie, 2012. "Regulatory governance in African telecommunications: Testing the resource curse hypothesis," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 691-703.
    4. Larrú, José María, 2010. "Foreign Aid in Equatorial Guinea: Macroeconomic Features and Future Challenges," MPRA Paper 25001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Gilbert E. Metcalf and Catherine Wolfram, 2015. "Cursed Resources? Political Conditions and Oil Market Outcomes," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    6. Shabafrouz, Miriam, 2009. "Iran's Oil Wealth: Treasure and Trouble for the Shah's Regime. A Context-sensitive Analysis of the Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance," GIGA Working Papers 113, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    7. Meissner, Hannes, 2010. "The Resource Curse and Rentier States in the Caspian Region: A Need for Context Analysis," GIGA Working Papers 133, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    8. Araujo Rodrigues, Larissa & Luís Sauer, Ildo, 2015. "Exploratory assessment of the economic gains of a pre-salt oil field in Brazil," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 486-495.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Indra De Soysa & Eric Neumayer, 2007. "Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil War Onset: Results from a New Dataset of Natural Resource Rents, 1970—1999," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(3), pages 201-218, July.
    2. Adedokun, Ayokunu, 2017. "Post-conflict peacebuilding: A critical survey of the literature and avenues for future research," MERIT Working Papers 2017-016, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    3. Basedau, Matthias & Richter, Thomas, 2011. "Why Do Some Oil Exporters Experience Civil War But Others Do Not? – A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Net Oil-Exporting Countries," GIGA Working Papers 157, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    4. Wegenast, Tim, 2013. "The Impact of Fuel Ownership on Intrastate Violence," GIGA Working Papers 225, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    5. Kjetil Bjorvatn & Alireza Naghavi, 2010. "Rent seekers in rentier states: When greed brings peace," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 039, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    6. Elisabeth Gilmore & Nils Petter Gleditsch & Päivi Lujala & Jan Ketil Rod, 2005. "Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(3), pages 257-272, July.
    7. James Ron, 2005. "Paradigm in Distress?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(4), pages 443-450, August.
    8. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rohner, Dominic, 2012. "War and natural resource exploitation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1714-1729.
    9. Thomas Gries & Veronika Müller, 2020. "Conflict Economics and Psychological Human Needs," Working Papers CIE 135, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    10. Domingues Patrick, 2011. "A Database on the Mozambican Civil War," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-32, May.
    11. Addison,Tony & Boly,Amadou & Mveyange,Anthony Francis, 2017. "The impact of mining on spatial inequality recent evidence from Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7960, The World Bank.
    12. Bodea, Cristina & Higashijima, Masaaki & Singh, Raju Jan, 2016. "Oil and Civil Conflict: Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1-12.
    13. Wegenast, Tim, 2010. "Inclusive Institutions and the Onset of Internal Conflict in Resource-rich Countries," GIGA Working Papers 126, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    14. Addison,Tony & Boly,Amadou & Mveyange,Anthony Francis, 2017. "The impact of mining on spatial inequality recent evidence from Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7960, The World Bank.
    15. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
    16. Syed Mansoob Murshed & Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, 2009. "Revisiting the greed and grievance explanations for violent internal conflict," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(1), pages 87-111.
    17. Samuel Bazzi, Christopher Blattman, 2011. "Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Price- Working Paper 274," Working Papers 274, Center for Global Development.
    18. Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza & Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2018. "Natural resource rents and internal conflicts: Can decentralization lift the curse?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 186-205.
    19. Matthew Costello, 2018. "Oil and Gas Rents and Civilian Violence in the Middle East and North Africa, 1990–2004: A Resource Curse, or Rentier Peace?," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-20, March.
    20. Syed Mansoob Murshed, 2007. "The conflict-growth nexus and the poverty of nations," Working Papers 43, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Resource Curse; Paradox of Plenty; Oil; Rentier State; Violent Conflict; Political Stability; Developing World;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N5 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries
    • N50 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:gigawp:21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dueiide.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.