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Corporate Governance in Poland: the Impact of Mass Privatization

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  • Rapacki, Ryszard

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to discuss the role of the Mass Privatization Programme (MPP) in Poland, as a vehicle of change in the prevailing patterns of corporate governance in the emerging market economy. It is claimed that the Programme (also known as the National Investment Funds, or NIF, scheme) deserves the name of a genuine institutional innovation, as a novel way of effective privatization of firms involved coupled with their overhaul and in-depth restructuring. Unlike similar mass privatization schemes in other transition economies (e.g. Russia, Czech Republic or Slovakia) the Polish NIF Programme has had institutional guarantees built in for effective enforcement of private-like ownership rights and market-compatible corporate governance patterns.

Suggested Citation

  • Rapacki, Ryszard, 2000. "Corporate Governance in Poland: the Impact of Mass Privatization," EconStor Conference Papers 130544, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esconf:130544
    Note: Paper prepared for the VI World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies, Tampere, 29 July-3 August, 2000.
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    2. van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1997. "On the Role of Banks in Enterprise Restructuring: The Polish Example," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 44-64, February.
    3. Iraj Hashi, 1999. "The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass Privatisation With A Difference," Working Papers 995, Staffordshire University, Business School.
    4. Rapacki, Ryszard, 1999. "Polish Mass Privatisation Programme: The Employee Perceptions," EconStor Conference Papers 130543, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    privatization; Poland;

    JEL classification:

    • P34 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Finance
    • P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance

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