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Patent hold-up and royalty stacking: the case of multiple downstream firms

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  • Karbowski, Adam
  • Prokop, Jacek

Abstract

The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we study the patent hold-up problem in game-theoretic framework. We show that in subgame perfect equilibrium of the patent hold-up game the innovating manufacturer exerts reduced effort to develop the new product and the patent holder obtains the entire value of product innovation. Second, we show that royalty stacking, which is believed to magnify the patent hold-up, may cause less severe problems than the ones predicted by Lemley and Shapiro [11] when competition on the downstream product market is introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Karbowski, Adam & Prokop, Jacek, 2015. "Patent hold-up and royalty stacking: the case of multiple downstream firms," EconStor Conference Papers 127475, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esconf:127475
    DOI: 10.1016/S2212-5671(15)00666-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Karbowski, Adam & Prokop, Jacek, 2013. "Controversy over the economic justifications for patent protection," EconStor Conference Papers 127476, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    2. G. M.P. Swann, 2009. "The Economics of Innovation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13211.
    3. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2013. "The Case against Patents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 3-22, Winter.
    4. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2012. "Abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 518-527.
    5. Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2016. "The Optimal Scope of the Royalty Base in Patent Licensing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 45-73.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karbowski, Adam & Prokop, Jacek, 2019. "The Impact of Vertical R&D Cooperation on Market Performance of Firms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 7(4), pages 73-89.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    patent hold-up; royalty stacking; downstream competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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