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German sports clubs' recruitment of executive board members

Author

Listed:
  • Emrich, Eike
  • Frenger, Monika
  • Gassmann, Freya
  • Hämmerle, Martin
  • Pierdzioch, Christian

Abstract

This paper analyzes the recruitment of executive board members for German sports clubs, an issue of key interest given that volunteers play a dominant role in these sports clubs. Based on a new, micro-level data set, we examine how members of a sports club advance to become executive board members and how board members differ from ordinary members. Based on the results of our study, we examine whether Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" applies and whether democratic procedures for elections in sports clubs are replaced, even in part, by trust-based oligarchic structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Emrich, Eike & Frenger, Monika & Gassmann, Freya & Hämmerle, Martin & Pierdzioch, Christian, 2019. "German sports clubs' recruitment of executive board members," Working Papers of the European Institute for Socioeconomics 31, European Institute for Socioeconomics (EIS), Saarbrücken.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:eiswps:31
    DOI: 10.22028/D291-32286
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August.
    2. Cassinelli, C. W., 1953. "The Law of Oligarchy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(3), pages 773-784, September.
    3. Eike Emrich & Christian Pierdzioch, 2015. "Testing economic models of volunteer labour supply: some empirical evidence for the German Red Cross," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(40), pages 4247-4259, August.
    4. Nye, J. S., 1967. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 417-427, June.
    5. Freeman, Richard B, 1997. "Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 140-166, January.
    6. Erlinghagen, Marcel & Şaka, Belit & Steffentorweihen, Ina, 2015. "Führungspositionen im Ehrenamt: Ein weiterer Bereich der Benachteiligung von Frauen?," Duisburger Beiträge zur soziologischen Forschung 2015-03, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Sociology.
    7. Bruno Frey, 1971. "Why do high income people participate more in politics?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 101-105, September.
    8. Eike Emrich & Christian Pierdzioch, 2016. "A quantile-regression test of economic models of volunteer labor supply," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(1), pages 198-204.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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