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The formalization of banking supervision: A comparison between Japan and Sweden

Author

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  • Hotori, Eiji
  • Wendschlag, Mikael

Abstract

This study examines the formalization of banking supervision in Japan and Sweden that occurred in the decades around 1900. Using an incremental change approach, the respective cases are traced and examined from three dimensions: 1) the legal framework, 2) the banking supervisory agency, and 3) bank supervisory activities. As a result of the comparative analysis, we find several similarities and differences. The most important finding is that the two cases are similar, in that financial crises - generally considered to be a primary driver for major regulatory and supervisory reforms - did not play the main role in the formalization of supervision in either Japan or Sweden. Rather, the formalization was an incremental adjustment to the organic development of the banking sector, the general public's increasing exposure to the banks as deposit holders and borrowers, and the increased need for professionalization of the banking sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Hotori, Eiji & Wendschlag, Mikael, 2018. "The formalization of banking supervision: A comparison between Japan and Sweden," eabh Papers 18-03, The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:eabhps:1803
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anders Ögren (ed.), 2010. "The Swedish Financial Revolution," Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-29723-4, November.
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    3. Maximilian J.B. Hall, 1993. "Banking Regulation And Supervision," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 201.
    4. Lindgren, Håkan, 2002. "The Modernization Of Swedish Credit Markets, 1840–1905: Evidence From Probate Records," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(3), pages 810-832, September.
    5. Gibbons, Robert J., 1983. "German Yearbook on Business History 1982. Edited by Wolfram Engels and Hans Pohl (Editor in charge). Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1982. Pp. 186. $15.20," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 457-459, October.
    6. Capie,Forrest, 2010. "The Bank of England," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521192828, December.
    7. Alfredo Gigliobianco (editor) & Gianni Toniolo (editor), 2009. "Financial market regulation in the wake of financial crises: the historical experience," Workshop and Conferences 1, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Mitchener, Kris James, 2014. "The Evolution of Bank Supervision: Evidence from U.S. States," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 181, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking supervision; formalization; incremental change approach;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N25 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Asia including Middle East
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East

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