IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cbscwp/279.html

The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain

Author

Listed:
  • Budish, Eric B.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Budish, Eric B., 2018. "The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain," Working Papers 279, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:279
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/262681/1/wp279.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
    2. Athey, Susan & Parashkevov, Ivo & Sarukkai, Vishnu & Xia, Jing, 2016. "Bitcoin Pricing, Adoption, and Usage: Theory and Evidence," Research Papers 3469, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. David Cerezo Sánchez, 2022. "Pravuil: Global Consensus for a United World," FinTech, MDPI, vol. 1(4), pages 1-20, October.
    2. Galanis, Spyros, 2025. "No trade under verifiable information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 1-9.
    3. Podhorsky, Andrea, 2024. "Bursting the bitcoin bubble: Do market prices reflect fundamental bitcoin value?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    4. Matteo Benetton & Giovanni Compiani, 2024. "Investors’ Beliefs and Cryptocurrency Prices," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 197-236.
    5. Emiliano S Pagnotta, 2022. "Decentralizing Money: Bitcoin Prices and Blockchain Security," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(2), pages 866-907.
    6. Francesca Carapella & Edward Dumas & Jacob Gerszten & Nathan Swem, 2022. "Decentralized Finance (DeFi): Transformative Potential and Associated Risks," Policy Hub, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 2022(14), October.
    7. Zhong Xu & Chuanwei Zou, 2021. "What can blockchain do and cannot do?," China Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 4-25, January.
    8. Bertrand Crettez & Lisa Morhaim, 2022. "General equilibrium cryptocurrency pricing in an OLG model," Post-Print hal-04103599, HAL.
    9. Garratt, Rodney J. & van Oordt, Maarten R.C., 2026. "The crypto multiplier," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    10. Auer, Raphael & Tercero-Lucas, David, 2022. "Distrust or speculation? The socioeconomic drivers of U.S. cryptocurrency investments," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    11. Igor Makarov & Antoinette Schoar, 2022. "Cryptocurrencies and Decentralised Finance," BIS Working Papers 1061, Bank for International Settlements.
    12. Itay Goldstein & Deeksha Gupta & Ruslan Sverchkov, 2024. "Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(6), pages 4197-4246, December.
    13. Soria, Jorge & Moya, Jorge & Mohazab, Amin, 2023. "Optimal mining in proof-of-work blockchain protocols," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    14. Dionysopoulos, Lambis & Marra, Miriam & Urquhart, Andrew, 2024. "Central bank digital currencies: A critical review," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    15. repec:osf:socarx:34df5_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Jonathan Chiu & Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2022. "The economics of cryptocurrency: Bitcoin and beyond," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1762-1798, November.
    17. Ferreira, Daniel & Li, Jin & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2023. "Corporate capture of blockchain governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115618, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Hanna Halaburda & Guillaume Haeringer & Joshua Gans & Neil Gandal, 2022. "The Microeconomics of Cryptocurrencies," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 971-1013, September.
    19. Li, Zhicheng & Li, Jialong & Zhou, Ke, 2023. "Bitcoin transaction fees and the decentralization of Bitcoin mining pools," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PB).
    20. Michael Sockin & Wei Xiong, 2023. "A Model of Cryptocurrencies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(11), pages 6684-6707, November.
    21. Jia, Dun & Li, Yifan, 2023. "Bounded pool mining and the bounded Bitcoin price," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    22. Francesca Carapella & Nathan Swem, 2022. "Decentralized Finance (DeFi): Transformative Potential & Associated Risks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-057, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    23. Michael Sockin & Wei Xiong, 2023. "Decentralization through Tokenization," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 247-299, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
    2. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    3. Juan‐Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzman, 2010. "Output‐Expanding Collusion In The Presence Of A Competitive Fringe," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 106-126, March.
    4. Weili Chen & Jun Wu & Zibin Zheng & Chuan Chen & Yuren Zhou, 2019. "Market Manipulation of Bitcoin: Evidence from Mining the Mt. Gox Transaction Network," Papers 1902.01941, arXiv.org.
    5. Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2016. "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    6. Makarov, Igor & Schoar, Antoinette, 2018. "Trading and Arbitrage in Cryptocurrency Markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118909, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Kimmo Berg & Gijs Schoenmakers, 2017. "Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14, November.
    8. , & ,, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    9. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, 2007. "Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 577-598, September.
    10. Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
    11. Carmona, Guilherme & Carvalho, Luís, 2016. "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 131-138.
    12. Hanna Halaburda & Guillaume Haeringer & Joshua Gans & Neil Gandal, 2022. "The Microeconomics of Cryptocurrencies," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 971-1013, September.
    13. Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Corrigendum to "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective"," Papers 1811.00455, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2018.
    14. Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for - 1 and a Folk Theorem," Post-Print hal-00543616, HAL.
    15. Jovanovic, Boyan & Prat, Julien, 2021. "Reputation and earnings dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    16. Cesi Berardino & Iozzi Alberto & Valentini Edilio, 2012. "Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, September.
    17. Sofia Moroni, 2016. "Sniping in Proxy Auctions with Deadlines," Working Paper 5875, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    18. Christian Hilbe & Moshe Hoffman & Martin A. Nowak, 2015. "Cooperate without Looking in a Non-Repeated Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-15, September.
    19. Tobias Salz & Emanuel Vespa, 2020. "Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 447-469, June.
    20. Helios Herrera & Guillermo Ordoñez & Christoph Trebesch, 2020. "Political Booms, Financial Crises," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 507-543.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:279. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/gsuchus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.