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The payout behaviour of German savings banks

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  • Köhler, Matthias

Abstract

Our analysis finds that despite the growing number, the majority of savings banks currently do not make any payouts. Furthermore, savings banks distribute only a small part of their net profit to the shareholders. This means that they can still build up capital even if they make payouts. Savings banks also hold significantly more capital than is called for by the regulatory framework. Finally, the regression analysis shows that savings banks that have less capital distribute profits to their shareholders considerably less frequently. This correlation has intensified since 2009, even though the Savings Banks Acts (Sparkassengesetze) were relaxed in individual federal states. All in all, our results therefore indicate that payouts do not currently pose a threat to the capital adequacy of most savings banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Köhler, Matthias, 2016. "The payout behaviour of German savings banks," Discussion Papers 24/2016, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:242016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Koetter, M. & Bos, J.W.B. & Heid, F. & Kolari, J.W. & Kool, C.J.M. & Porath, D., 2007. "Accounting for distress in bank mergers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3200-3217, October.
    2. Sven Bornemann & Susanne Homölle & Carsten Hubensack & Thomas Kick & Andreas Pfingsten, 2014. "Visible Reserves in Banks – Determinants of Initial Creation, Usage and Contribution to Bank Stability," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5-6), pages 507-544, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    savings banks; distributions; capital adequacy;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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