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Policy instrument choice and non-coordinated monetary in interdependent economies

  • Lombardo, Giovanni
  • Sutherland, Alan

Non-coordinated monetary policy is analysed in a stochastic two-country general equilibrium model. Non-coordinated equilibria are compared in two cases: one where policy is set in terms of state-contingent money supply rules and one where policy is set in terms of state-contingent nominal interest rate rules. In general the non-coordinated equilibrium differs between the two types of policy rule but a number of special cases are identified where the equilibria are identical. The endogenous choice of policy instrument is analysed and the Nash equilibrium in the choice of policy instrument is shown to depend on the interest elasticity of money demand.

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Paper provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre in its series Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies with number 2004,03.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:1544
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  1. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 2001. "International Dimensions of Optimal Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8230, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Benigno, Gianluca & Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2001. "Price Stability as a Nash Equilibrium in Monetary Open-Economy Models," CEPR Discussion Papers 2757, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Sutherland, Alan, 2002. "Incomplete Pass-Through and the Welfare Effects of Exchange Rate Variability," CEPR Discussion Papers 3431, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 2001. "Welfare And Macroeconomic Interdependence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 421-445, May.
  5. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2001. "Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt6412m5b7, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  6. Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Cumby, Robert E. & Diba, Behzad T., 2005. "The need for international policy coordination: what's old, what's new, what's yet to come?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 363-384, July.
  7. Michael B. Devereux & Charles Engel, 2003. "Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange-Rate Flexibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 765-783.
  8. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1995. "Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 624-60, June.
  9. Lane, Philip R., 1999. "The New Open Economy Macroeconomics: a Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 2115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. William Poole, 1970. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Staff Studies 57, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  11. Alan Sutherland, 2002. "International monetary policy coordination and financial market integration," International Finance Discussion Papers 751, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  12. Stephen J. Turnovsky & Vasco d'Orey, 1988. "The Choice of Monetary Instrument in Two Interdependent Economies Under Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 2604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson, 1991. "Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031787, August.
  14. Philippe BACCHETTA & Eric VAN WINCOOP, 1999. "Does Exchange Rate Stability Increase Trade and Welfare ?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9917, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  15. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 2002. "A simple framework for international monetary policy analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 879-904, July.
  16. Obstfeld, M., 1998. "Risk and Exchange Rate," Papers 193, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
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