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Should unemployment benefits decrease as the unemployment spell lengthens?

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  • Saarenheimo, Tuomas

Abstract

It has become a conventional wisdom in economic policy debate that in order to minimise adverse effects on employment, unemployment benefits should decrease with the unemployment spell.This paper, using a series of simple search models, shows that the theoretical result regarding the optimality of a declining unemployment benefit profile is largely a result of specific modeling assumptions and fails to hold in a more general setting.While any pure reduction of unemployment benefits always improves employment, a redistribution of unemployment benefits from the long-term unemployed in favour of the short-term unemployed can either increase or decrease unemployment and unemployment benefit expenditure.The direction of the effect depends, inter alia, on the structure of unemployment and on the extent to which employed workers can reduce their lay-off probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Saarenheimo, Tuomas, 2001. "Should unemployment benefits decrease as the unemployment spell lengthens?," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 23/2001, Bank of Finland.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bofrdp:rdp2001_023
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-1362, December.
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    3. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen, 1996. "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-41, June.
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    6. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
    7. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 359-387, June.
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    9. Angela Huang & Dimitri Margaritis & David Mayes, 2001. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Evidence from New Zealand," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 5(3), pages 175-200, September.
    10. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627, Elsevier.
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    12. Sinko, Pekka, 2001. "Unemployment Insurance with Limited Duration and Variable Replacement Ratio - Effects on Optimal Search," Discussion Papers 253, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
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