Voluntary income sharing and the design of unemployment insurance
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- El Lahga, AbdelRahmen & Moreau, Nicolas, 2007.
"Would you Marry me? The Effects of Marriage on German Couples? Allocation of Time,"
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More about this item
KeywordsJEL classification: H11; H31; J68; Key words: Income sharing; unemployment insurance; altruism;
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
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