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Stable Constitutions

Author

Listed:
  • Daeyoung Jeong

    (New York University Abu Dhabi)

  • Semin Kim

    (Yonsei University)

Abstract

This study identifies a set of stable constitutions. A constitution is a pair of voting rules (f, F) where f is for the choice of final outcome, and F is for the decision on the change of a voting rule from the given rule f. A constitution is stable if any possible alternative rule does not get enough votes to replace the given rule f under the rule F. We fully characterize the set of interim stable constitutions among anonymous voting rules. We also characterize the properties of the interim stable constitutions among general weighted majority rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Daeyoung Jeong & Semin Kim, 2018. "Stable Constitutions," Working papers 2018rwp-139, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:yon:wpaper:2018rwp-139
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yaron Azrieli & Semin Kim, 2014. "Pareto Efficiency And Weighted Majority Rules," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 1067-1088, November.
    2. Azrieli, Yaron & Kim, Semin, 2016. "On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 376-389.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Weighted majority rules; decision rules; self-stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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