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Investigating the Intellectual Origins of Euroland’s Macroeconomic Policy Regime: Central Banking Institutions and Traditions in West Germany After the War

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  • Jörg Bibow

    (Levy Economics Institute)

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-) establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on the ‘independence’ of the central bank, which, together with a ‘stability-orientation’ in monetary policy, proved a lasting German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to a widespread presumption, Ordoliberalism, the dominant contemporary force within the German economics profession widely held to have shaped the new economic order of West Germany called ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ (social market economy), is found to have had no such impact on the country’s emerging monetary order at all. In fact, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and some key ideas underlying Ordoliberalism will be identified. Nor can an alternative – more Keynesian – policy regime and model of central bank independence that was developed in the mid 1950s by the Economic Advisory Council of Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s famous first economics minister, claim any credit for the eventual legal status of the central bank that became enshrined in the Bundesbank Act of 1957; a regime that subsequently remained untouched despite the (Keynesian) ‘Stability and Growth Act’ of 1967. It appears that, while contemporary economic theory had no decisive influence on the outcome, the central bank’s role as a political actor in its own right and in carving public opinion should not be underestimated in explaining a peculiar German tradition that was finally exported to Europe in the 1990s. Key words: central banking, central bank independence, Ordoliberalism, Keynesianism, monetarism JEL classifications: B22, B31, E50

Suggested Citation

  • Jörg Bibow, 2004. "Investigating the Intellectual Origins of Euroland’s Macroeconomic Policy Regime: Central Banking Institutions and Traditions in West Germany After the War," Method and Hist of Econ Thought 0405005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmh:0405005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans A. Adler, 1949. "The Post-War Reorganization of the German Banking System," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 322-341.
    2. Jorg Bibow, 2002. "What has Happened to Monetarism? An Investigation into the Keynesian Roots of Milton Friedman's Monetary Thought and Its Apparent Monetarist Legacies," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_347, Levy Economics Institute.
    3. Jörg Bibow, 2002. "Keynes on Central Banking and the Structure of Monetary Policy," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 749-787, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorg Bibow, 2005. "Bad for Euroland, Worse for Germany: The ECB's Record," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_429, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. Jorg Bibow, 2004. "Assessing the ECB's Performance since the Global Slowdown: A Structural Policy Bias Coming Home to Roost?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_409, Levy Economics Institute.
    3. Jörg Bibow, 2006. "Europe's Quest for Monetary Stability. Central Banking Gone Astray," International Journal of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(1), pages 24-43.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central banking; central bank independence; Ordoliberalism; Keynesianism; monetarism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B22 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Macroeconomics
    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General

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