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What Does the UN Convention on Corruption Teach Us About International Regulatory Harmonisation?

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  • Bryane Michael

    (Oxford University)

Abstract

Should international institutions promote international regulatory harmonisation? This paper will present arguments, looking at the UN Convention Against Corruption, noting that international institution regulation may play less of a harmonising role that it ostensibly appears to. Section I discusses the underlying motivations for harmonisation, presenting three views of regulation based on the likely effects of 'globalisation' and noting most views support global harmonisation. Section II will discuss specifically the UN Corruption Convention and compare the Convention (which aims at global harmonising of certain practices against corruption) against its ideals and an optimal regulation. Section III will discuss the influence of regulatory 'clubs' (such as the OECD or OAS Corruption Conventions) and show how regional harmonisation may be superior to global harmonisation in terms of reaching an ideal and optimum. Section III will address how global harmonisation may be deleterious to national interests and will discuss how such global harmonisation may be 'domesticated' in the nations' laws and moeurs. Because business practices depend on a wide range of influences in the national business system, attempts at harmonisation are at best 'ambivalent'.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryane Michael, 2004. "What Does the UN Convention on Corruption Teach Us About International Regulatory Harmonisation?," Macroeconomics 0406004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0406004
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mac/papers/0406/0406004.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Argandoña, 2007. "The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and its Impact on International Companies," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 481-496, September.

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    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

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