Individual Decision-Making to Commit a Crime: Early Models
The authors provide the summary of the most important findings of the early models of economics of crime, namely the models of Becker, Ehrlich and Heineke. These models study rational individual decision-making about entering into illegal activities. Probability and siže of punishment, attitudes towards risk, gains form crime and income are the main variables which causes the results of the individual behavior. The authors also discuss weaknesses of these models such as its static nature or ignoring interactive decision-making. The relationship to the theory of optimal law enforcement is also presented.
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- Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December.
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- Singh, Balbir, 1973. "Making honesty the best policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 257-263, July.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
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