Impact of U.S. Tariffs on Democratic Vote Share
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More about this item
Keywordstariffs; Democratic vote share; campaign contributions; House election;
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-POL-2005-11-05 (Positive Political Economics)
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