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Impact of U.S. Tariffs on Democratic Vote Share

  • Miaojie Yu

This paper provides evidence on an amended Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin model with parties by studying the effects of U.S. tariffs on the Democratic vote share. The effects are estimated with fixed effects and Two-Stage Least Squares based on data from the House of Representatives from the years 1982 to 2000. Weighted trade policy proxy for each congressional district are constructed and shown to be significant. Overall, a 10% decrease of weighted tariffs leads to a 12% decrease in the Democratic vote share in the election to the House, ceteris paribus. Also, the predictions of the model for electoral outcome are consistent with today’s U.S. politics.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/it/papers/0511/0511001.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number 0511001.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 03 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0511001
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 35
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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  1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
  2. Robert C. Feenstra & Gene M. Grossman & Douglas A. Irwin (ed.), 1996. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061864, June.
  3. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 107-133, October.
  4. Leamer, E. & Levingsohn, J., 1994. "International Trade Theory: The Evidence," Working Papers 368, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  5. Robert E. Baldwin & Christopher S. Magee, 1998. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers 6376, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Douglas A. Irwin, 1995. "Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy? Evidence from the BritishGeneral Election of 1923," NBER Working Papers 5170, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
  8. Robert C. Feenstra & Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 245-262 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Beaulieu, Eugene, 2002. "The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem Faces Congress," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 343-60, May.
  10. Anderson, T W & Sawa, Takamitsu, 1979. "Evaluation of the Distribution Function of the Two-Stage Least Squares Estimate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 163-82, January.
  11. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February.
  12. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1994. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," NBER Technical Working Papers 0151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521377003 is not listed on IDEAS
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