Electoral Competiton and Optimal Tariffs
I show that the unique Nash equilibrium of a model of political competition between two parties in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting entails differentiated trade policies, with a party proposing a high tariff, and the other one a low one. The basic departure from a median voter model is the introduction of campaign contributions, which influence the vote of a group of uninformed voters. Parties are Downsian, not ideological, yet campaign contributions create an asymmetry between them. Thus, the heterogeneous behavior of parties, protectionism and pro-trade, is endogenously decided, rather than a prior assumed in previous works.
|Date of creation:||05 Sep 2005|
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"Protection for Sale,"
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"Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics,"
NBER Working Papers
4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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