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Slave Redemption When it Takes Time to Redeem Slaves

Author

Listed:
  • Carol Ann Rogers

    (Georgetown University)

  • Kenneth A Swinnerton

    (U.S. Department of Labor)

Abstract

We analyze slave redemption programs—the buying of slaves to give them their freedom--in a simple matching model, i.e., under the assumption that it takes time to find slaves to buy or sell. Unlike in a supply and demand framework, where sufficiently large and effective redemption programs must lead to an increase in the price at which slaves are exchanged, we find that such programs do not necessarily raise the price of slaves. We also use the model to explain why a slave redemption program can slow the flow of people into the actual state of slavery, but at the same time can increase the number of people captured to be slaves. We present contemporary examples to suggest that the weight that should be assigned to costs inflicted on the extra captured people, versus the benefits enjoyed by those redeemed, depends critically on the nature of the experience at, and just after, capture.

Suggested Citation

  • Carol Ann Rogers & Kenneth A Swinnerton, 2005. "Slave Redemption When it Takes Time to Redeem Slaves," Development and Comp Systems 0510006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0510006
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/dev/papers/0510/0510006.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carol Ann Rogers & Kenneth A. Swinnerton, 2008. "A theory of exploitative child labor," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 20-41, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    slavery; matching models;

    JEL classification:

    • O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth
    • P - Economic Systems

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