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The Global Fight against Child Trafficking: How Can It Be Won ?

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Dessy
  • Caroline Orset
  • Legrand Yémélé Kana

Abstract

We study how countries can coordinate their national action plans so as to fight global child trafficking. As both the demand and supply of trafficked children are transboundary in scope, international cooperation may be necessary to mitigate cross-country externalities. We show that specialization is the main feature of international cooperation. We also show that the pattern of specialization depends only on the level of economic development of state-parties. In particular, specialization leads to asymmetric national action plans when state-parties have different levels of economic development: the governments of poorer countries specialize on fighting the supply of trafficked children from their territories, while the governments of richer countries specialize on fighting the demand arising within their territories.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Dessy & Caroline Orset & Legrand Yémélé Kana, 2012. "The Global Fight against Child Trafficking: How Can It Be Won ?," Cahiers de recherche 1213, CIRPEE.
    • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1213
    as

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    File URL: http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2012/CIRPEE12-13.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carol Ann Rogers & Kenneth A. Swinnerton, 2008. "A theory of exploitative child labor," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 20-41, January.
    2. Boucher, Vincent & Bramoullé, Yann, 2010. "Providing global public goods under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 591-603, October.
    3. Sylvain E. Dessy & Stéphane Pallage, 2005. "A Theory of the Worst Forms of Child Labour," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 68-87, January.
    4. Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Child trafficking; externalities; international cooperation; cooperative equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • J47 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Coercive Labor Markets
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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