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Fiscal Visibility in Spain: Two Types of Estimates

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  • Miguel Roig-Alonso

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Abstract

The size and pattern of any public budget depend, among other factors, on the visibility of both the burdens and the benefits of public revenue and public expenditure. Furthermore, such visibility is a necessary - not a sufficient - condition for an efficient allocation of resources between the private and public sectors of an economy. The aim of this contribution, based on a recent research, is to simultaneously present additive and arithmetic indicators for local, intermediate and central territorial government levels and to initially apply them to Spain by using data and information provided by the International Monetary Fund. Conclusions and comments are offered for general criticism, discussion, theoretical development and future application to other OECD countries.

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  • Miguel Roig-Alonso, 2004. "Fiscal Visibility in Spain: Two Types of Estimates," ERSA conference papers ersa04p97, European Regional Science Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa04p97
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    1. Dennis Mueller & Peter Murrell, 1986. "Interest groups and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 125-145, January.
    2. Fiorina, Morris P. & Noll, Roger G., 1978. "Voters, bureaucrats and legislators : A rational choice perspective on the growth of bureaucracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 239-254, April.
    3. Pommerehne, Werner W & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "Fiscal Illusion, Political Institutions, and Local Public Spending," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 381-408.
    4. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
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