Credence Goods, Consumer Misinformation, and Quality
For certain products, consumers' misinformation about quality is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the top or the bottom levels of quality. Using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation with three quality levels - green, natural, and brown - we examine the consequences of consumers' overestimation of the quality of the natural (i.e. intermediate quality) product. There are three firms in the market, with each type of firm producing the corresponding type of the product. The firms choose the quality level of their product before choosing its price (Bertrand case) or quantity (Cournot case). Irrespective of the nature of second stage competition, we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the natural firm, and motivates it to raise its product’s quality. In response, the green firm improves its quality even further, but ends up with lower profit. Overall, average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves, which raises consumer surplus. Social welfare increases when firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (204) 786-9422
Fax: (204) 772-4183
Web page: http://economics.uwinnipeg.ca/RePEc/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Goss, Jody & Holcomb, Rodney B. & Ward, Clement E., 2002. "Factors Influencing Consumer Decisions Related To "Natural" Beef In The Southern Plains," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 33(01), March.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Gergely Ujhelyi, 2006.
NBER Working Papers
12784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Crampes, Claude & Hollander, Abraham, 1995.
"Duopoly and quality standards,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 71-82, January.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1991. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Cahiers de recherche 9128, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Crampes, C. & Hollander, A., 1992. "Duopoly and Quality Standards," Papers 92.g, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Valletti, Tommaso M, 2000. "Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 235-45, November.
- Scarpa, Carlo, 1998. "Minimum quality standards with more than two firms1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 665-676, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:win:winwop:2012-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Soham Baksi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.