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Information Asymmetries and Remittance Recipient Income: A Field Experiment in Malawi

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Abstract

A growing literature suggests that asymmetric information about migrant income may affect the remittance behavior of migrants. In this study we examine whether improving information about the economic status of recipients impacts migrant remittance decisions. In a sample of internal migrants and their remittance recipients in Malawi, we provide a randomly chosen half of migrants with information regarding the agricultural production of their recipients’ farmer clubs. We test whether this information impacts remittances sent immediately following information provision and over the next three weeks. We find no evidence that the information impacts remittances, but our estimates are imprecise.

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  • Kate Ambler & Susan Godlonton, 2020. "Information Asymmetries and Remittance Recipient Income: A Field Experiment in Malawi," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020-12, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    • Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2020-11
    Note: This is a revised version of paper 2019-25.
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    Keywords

    Labor Supply; Agriculture; Malawi;
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