IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/1869.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Risk reduction and public spending

Author

Listed:
  • Devarajan, Shantayanan
  • Hammer, Jeffrey S.

Abstract

As governments grow richer, the share of their GDP devoted to public spending rises. Public spending in the United States was 7.5 percent of GDP in 1913. It is 33 percent today. Although industrial countries spend twice as much as developing countries, government spending on goods and services is the same in both groups of countries. The difference is almost entirely due to transfer payments, which are about 22 percent of GDP in the industrial world. Most of these transfer payments - pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, guaranteed loans- are aimed at mitigating risk in the private sector The authors explore how the framework for evaluating government spending on goods and services can be extended to incorporate the government's various risk-reducing activities. The authors argue that there is a case for incorporating risk reduction into government spending, if doing so meets standard welfare-economics criteria for government intervention in the economy. Through examples - government-provided health insurance and crop insurance, price stabilization schemes, transfer programs for income support, public investments, publicly provided health care, and government credit guarantees - they show where government spending on risk reduction could improve welfare, by either alleviating a failure in risk markets or by reducing uncertainty in otherwise distorted markets. They illustrate calculations of the risk-reduction benefits of public spending and cite cases where their neglect could lead to serious underestimates.

Suggested Citation

  • Devarajan, Shantayanan & Hammer, Jeffrey S., 1998. "Risk reduction and public spending," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1869, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1869
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1998/01/01/000009265_3980219162709/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fisher, Anthony C, 1973. "Environmental Externalities and the Arrow-Lind Public Investment Theorem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(4), pages 722-725, September.
    2. Hammer, Jeffrey S, 1997. "Economic Analysis for Health Projects," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 12(1), pages 47-71, February.
    3. Tanzi, Vito & Schuknecht, Ludger, 1997. "Reconsidering the Fiscal Role of Government: The International Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 164-168, May.
    4. Sen, Amartya K, 1972. "Control Areas and Accounting Prices: An Approach to Economic Evaluation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 82(325), pages 486-501, Supplemen.
    5. Donald Cox & Emmanuel Jiminez, 1993. "Private Transfers And The Effectiveness Of Public Income Redistribution In The Philippines," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 236, Boston College Department of Economics.
    6. Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, 1974. "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 3, pages 54-75, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Lant Pritchett, 1997. "Divergence, Big Time," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 3-17, Summer.
    8. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 229-264.
    9. Alderman, Harold & Lavy, Victor, 1996. "Household Responses to Public Health Services: Cost and Quality Tradeoffs," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 11(1), pages 3-22, February.
    10. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    11. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dailami, Monsoor, 2000. "Financial openness, democracy, and redistributive policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2372, The World Bank.
    2. World Bank, 2001. "Brazil - Public Expenditures for Poverty Alleviation in Northeast Brazil : Promoting Growth and Improving Services," World Bank Publications - Reports 15510, The World Bank Group.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Shantayanan Devarajan & F. Halsey Rogers, 2002. "World Bank Economists' Forum : Volume 2," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15227, December.
    2. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2011. "Risk absorption by the state: when is it good public policy ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5893, The World Bank.
    3. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1994. "Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 61-95.
    4. Belen Jerez, 2000. "General Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information: A Dual Approach," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1497, Econometric Society.
    5. Braga, Joao Paulo & Semmler, Willi & Grass, Dieter, 2021. "De-risking of green investments through a green bond market – Empirics and a dynamic model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    6. Belli, Pedro, 1997. "The comparative advantage of government : a review," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1834, The World Bank.
    7. Samuel G. Hanson & David S. Scharfstein & Adi Sunderam, 2016. "Fiscal Risk and the Portfolio of Government Programs," NBER Working Papers 22763, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2004. "Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, Part 2," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 48(1), pages 17-49, March.
    9. Innes, Robert, 1987. "Asymmetric Information And The Entrepreneurial Firm: Capital Structure, Investment And Government Intervention," Working Papers 225813, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    10. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2014. "Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 76-86.
    11. Plisson, Manuel, 2009. "Assurabilité et développement de l'assurance dépendance," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5064 edited by Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé.
    12. Innes, Robert, 1987. "Adverse Selection And Tax Externalities In A Model Of Entrepreneurial Investment," Working Papers 225812, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    13. Suarez, Javier & Sánchez Serrano, Antonio, 2018. "Approaching non-performing loans from a macroprudential angle," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 7, European Systemic Risk Board.
    14. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    15. Gray, Richard S., 1990. "The Role of Learning in Investment Decisions," 1990 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Vancouver, Canada 261490, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    16. Anton Korinek & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2018. "Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications for Income Distribution and Unemployment," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, pages 349-390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Bo Liu & James D. Shilling & Tien Foo Sing, 2020. "Large Banks and Efficient Banks: how Do they Influence Credit Supply and Default Risk?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 1-28, February.
    18. AKM Rezaul Hossain, 2005. "A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities," Working papers 2005-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    19. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco, 2019. "Too Little Lending: A Problem of Symmetric Information," MPRA Paper 93700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2002. "New perspectives on public finance: recent achievements and future challenges," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 341-360, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1869. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.