Publicpension governance and performance : lessons for developing countries
The author examines the relationship between public sector pension plan performance and management practices to improve the design and governance of public pensions in developing countries. Understanding this relationship is important because better yields on public pension plan investment reduce the need for additional taxes to support retirees - and well-funded plans stand a better chance of paying promised benefits. The author's model relates investment returns on public pension assets, as well as plan funding status, to features characterizing the pension systems'governance structure and authority, using new data set on U.S. state and local public sector plans. The following findings stand out. The higher the fraction of retirees elected to the pension board, the stronger the negative effect on investment return in 1990, and the more variable the returns. Systems fared about the same whether they had in-house or external money managers, or independent performance analysis (even if the external managers were drawn from the top 10). But public pensions performed better when fund and actuarial computations were done by professional actuarial and investment counselors rather than relying on former or current employees to choose investment strategies. Social investment rules hurt public pension yields. Public pension plans which mandated that a certain portion of investments be director to instate projects generated much lower returns. The data show that many public pension systems funded their plans satisfactorily but others did not. The results show the following. Fiscal stress reduced stock funding ratios. Stock funding rates were lower, the higher the fraction of elected retirees and elected active workers represented on the pension system board. Stock funding ratios were higher when a system had in-house actuaries, when the board authorized benefit levels, and when board members had liability insurance. Stock funding rates were unaltered by state statutes guaranteering that benefits be guaranteed by law, or by legally set funding requirements, or by the state's ability to carry budget deficits from one year to the next. Nor did they vary when dedicated or special taxes were earmarked for pension revenue. Policymakers in developing countries can profit from the mistakes made and lessons learned by U.S. pension analysis. Although no single package of pension plan practices can optimize investment performance for all systems across all time periods, care must be taken when designing the regulatory and investment environment in which these plans operate. Developing countries should study the work of the U.S. Government Accounting Standards Board. The author discusses some of the complex issues that must be confronted when establishing funding norms for defined benefit pension plans in the public sector.
|Date of creation:||31 Oct 1993|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lakonishok, Josef, et al, 1991.
"Window Dressing by Pension Fund Managers,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 227-231, May.
- Josef Lakonishok & Andrei Shleifer & Richard Thaler & Robert Vishny, 1991. "Window Dressing by Pension Fund Managers," NBER Working Papers 3617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mitchell, Olivia S & Smith, Robert S, 1994. "Pension Funding in the Public Sector," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 278-290, May.
- Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, 1991. "Pension Funding in the Public Sector," NBER Working Papers 3898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 73-92.
- Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, 1993. "Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle," NBER Working Papers 4369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, "undated". "Retirement Systems in Developed and Developing Countries: Institutional Features, Economic Effects, and Lessons for Economies in Transition," Pension Research Council Working Papers 94-3, Wharton School Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, 1993. "Retirement Systems in Developed and Developing Countries: Institutional Features, Economic Effects, and Lessons for Economies in Transition," NBER Working Papers 4424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grinblatt, Mark & Titman, Sheridan D, 1989. "Mutual Fund Performance: An Analysis of Quarterly Portfolio Holdings," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(3), pages 393-416, July.
- Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, "undated". "Mutual Fund Performance: An Analysis of Quarterly Portfolio Holdings," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 23-88, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Alan L. Gustman & Olivia S. Mitchell, 1990. "Pensions and the U.S. Labor Market," NBER Working Papers 3331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mitchell, Olivia S, 1988. "Worker Knowledge of Pension Provisions," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(1), pages 21-39, January.
- Olivia S. Mitchell, 1987. "Worker Knowledge of Pension Provisions," NBER Working Papers 2414, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James, Estelle, 1992. "Income security for old age : conceptual background and major issues," Policy Research Working Paper Series 977, The World Bank.
- Lakonishok, Joseph & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1992. "The Structure and Performance of the Money Management Industry," Scholarly Articles 10498059, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper, 1981. "Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 141-178, January.
- Olivia S. Mitchell & Ping-Lung Hsin, "undated". "Public Pension Governance and Performance," Pension Research Council Working Papers 94-1, Wharton School Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania.
- Smith, Robert Stewart, 1981. "Compensating Differentials for Pensions and Underfunding in the Public Sector," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 63(3), pages 463-468, August.
- Olivia S. Mitchell & Ping Lung Hsin, 1994. "Public Sector Pension Governance and Performance," NBER Working Papers 4632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olivia S. Mitchell & Emily S. Andrews, 1981. "Scale Economies in Private Multi-Employer Pension Systems," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 34(4), pages 522-530, July.
- Alicia H. Munnell & C. Nicole Ernsberger, 1989. "Public pension surpluses and national saving: foreign experience," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 16-38.
- Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, "undated". "Public Sector Pension Funding," Pension Research Council Working Papers 94-4, Wharton School Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1199. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.