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On Kolm's Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory

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  • John A. Weymark

    () (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

Serge Kolm's "epistemic counterfactual principle" says that a social choice only needs to be made from the actual feasible set of alternatives given the actual preference profile, but it must be justified by the choices that would have been made in appropriate counterfactual choice situations. Kolm's principle does not identify the relevant counterfactuals. In this article, it is argued that the appropriate counterfactuals to justify an impartial social choice are all of the choice situations that a moral agent behind a veil of ignorance might think is the actual choice situation outside the veil.

Suggested Citation

  • John A. Weymark, 2005. "On Kolm's Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0518, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0518
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu05-w18R.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Prasanta Pattanaik, 2005. "Little and Bergson on Arrow's concept of social welfare," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 369-379, December.
    2. Kolm, Serge-Christophe, 1994. "Rational normative economics vs 'social welfare' and 'social choice'," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 721-730, April.
    3. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    4. Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2005. "The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 381-418, December.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61, pages 434-434.
    6. Robert A. Pollak, 1979. "Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 73-90.
    7. Donaldson, David & Weymark, John A., 1988. "Social choice in economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 291-308, December.
    8. Abram Bergson, 1954. "On the Concept of Social Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 233-252.
    9. Kemp, Murray C & Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1976. "On the Existence of Social Welfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(169), pages 59-66, February.
    10. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
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    13. William Vickrey, 1960. "Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 507-535.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arrovian social choice; counterfactual choice; veil of ignorance; impartial observer; universal prescriptivism;

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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