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Labor Supply, Divorce and Remarriage

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Abstract

This paper considers the role of the entire marital history in labor market decisions. A distinction is made between married, remarried, single and divorced women in the estimation of standard participation and labor supply functions. In specifications controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity, white remarried women are more likely to participate in the labor force and have higher labor supply than that of white married women. The results indicate that a substantial fraction of the total change in employment rates of all married women over time is due to the increase in the number of remarried women in the population.

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  • Shannon N. Seitz, 1999. "Labor Supply, Divorce and Remarriage," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9908, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9908
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