Financial Engineering and Rationality: Experimental Evidence Based on the Monty Hall Problem
Financial engineering often involves redefining existing financial assets to create new financial products. This paper investigates whether financial engineering can alter the environment so that irrational agents can quickly learn to be rational. The specific environment we investigate is based on the Monty Hall problem, a well-studied choice anomaly. Our results show that, by the end of the experiment, the majority of subjects understand the Monty Hall anomaly. Average valuation of the experimental asset is very close to the expected value based on the true probabilities.
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- Slembeck, Tilman & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2004.
"Do institutions promote rationality?: An experimental study of the three-door anomaly,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 337-350, July.
- Tilman Slembeck & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Do Institutions Promote Rationality? An Experimental Study of the Three-Door Anomaly," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 2002-21, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Page, Scott E., 1998. "Let's make a deal," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 175-180, November.
- Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2003. "Learning to Open Monty Hall's Doors," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(3), pages 235-251, November.
- Brian D. Kluger & Steve B. Wyatt, 2004. "Are Judgment Errors Reflected in Market Prices and Allocations? Experimental Evidence Based on the Monty Hall Problem," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 969-998, June.
- Friedman, Daniel, 1998. "Monty Hall's Three Doors: Construction and Deconstruction of a Choice Anomaly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 933-946, September.
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