A way to play bankruptcy problems
The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially when they have to decide how to distribute the available amount of a scarce resource among all. On the one hand, there are a multiplicity of possible ways for assigning the available amount; and, on the other hand, each agent is going to propose that distribution which provides her the highest possible award. In this paper, with the purpose of making this agreement easier, firstly we use two different sets of basic properties, called Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, to delimit what agents can propose as reasonable allocations. Secondly, we extend the results obtained by Chun (1989) and Herrero (2003), obtaining new characterizations of old and well known bankruptcy rules. Finally, using the fact that bankruptcy problems can be analyzed from awards and losses, we define a mechanism which provides a new justification of the convex combinations of bankruptcy rules. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Unanimous Concessions procedure, Diminishing Claims mechanism, Pinilesâ€™ rule, Constrained Egalitarian rule. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.
|Date of creation:||2011|
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