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Health, Wealth and Workforce Exit: Disability Insurance and Individual Accounts

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  • Jason S. Seligman

    (University of Georgia)

Abstract

Current debate on the Social Security Administrations long-term finance of benefits includes proposals for independent private investment via individual accounts. The author first investigates what implications disability might have for equity savings account balances. In light of results, incentives to exit the workforce ahead of retirement age are considered when a defined benefit program for disability insurance continues to be available. Included simulation uses historic wage series, equity market performance, and current OASDI regulations for cohorts retiring over the period of 1929 - 2003.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason S. Seligman, 2005. "Health, Wealth and Workforce Exit: Disability Insurance and Individual Accounts," Upjohn Working Papers 05-116, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:upj:weupjo:05-116
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diamond, Peter & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1995. "Economic aspects of optimal disability benefits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, May.
    2. Peter A. Diamond, 1996. "Proposals to Restructure Social Security," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 67-88, Summer.
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