Health, Wealth and Workforce Exit: Disability Insurance and Individual Accounts
Current debate on the Social Security Administrations long-term finance of benefits includes proposals for independent private investment via individual accounts. The author first investigates what implications disability might have for equity savings account balances. In light of results, incentives to exit the workforce ahead of retirement age are considered when a defined benefit program for disability insurance continues to be available. Included simulation uses historic wage series, equity market performance, and current OASDI regulations for cohorts retiring over the period of 1929 - 2003.
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- Peter A. Diamond, 1996. "Proposals to Restructure Social Security," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 67-88, Summer.
- Sheshinski, E. & Diamond, P., 1992.
"Economic Aspects of Optimal Disability Benefits,"
92-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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