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Trucefully Yours: Hatred and the Prospects of Genuine and Stable Peace

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Abstract

This paper highlights the role of hatred and its evolution in determining the course of conflicts between nations following their signing of an agreement for truce. It analytically demonstrates that weak inertia, diminishing memory of hatred and a low propensity to reciprocate aversion are essential for reaching a genuine and stable peace. These propositions are employed to assess the prospects of genuine and stable peace between Israel and Palestine. It is argued that due to inertia, strong memory of collective hatred and high propensity to reciprocate collective aversion, the inherent course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not lead to a genuine and stable peace.

Suggested Citation

  • Levy, Amnon, 2004. "Trucefully Yours: Hatred and the Prospects of Genuine and Stable Peace," Economics Working Papers wp04-06, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
  • Handle: RePEc:uow:depec1:wp04-06
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    File URL: http://www.uow.edu.au/content/groups/public/@web/@commerce/@econ/documents/doc/uow012166.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Conflict; truce; hatred evolution; genuine and stable peace;
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