Democracy, Autocracy and the Likelihood of International Conflict
This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings.
|Date of creation:||13 Jun 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden|
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1994.
"Domestic Politics and International Conflict,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1294-1309, December.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Morelli, Massimo, .
"Political bias and war,"
1247, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Bester, Helmut & Wärneryd, Karl, 2006.
"Conflict and the Social Contract,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
94, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2004.
"It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-29, 03.
- Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2003. "It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace," CEPR Discussion Papers 3947, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2004. "It takes two : an explanation of the democratic peace," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 539, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2001.
"War and Democracy,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 776-810, August.
- Wintrobe,Ronald, 1998. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521583299.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0751. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Elisabeth Gustafsson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.