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A Theory of Reciprocity with Incomplete Information

  • Vostroknutov Alexander

    (METEOR)

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    A model of belief dependent preferences in finite multi-stage games with observable actions isproposed. It combines two dissimilar approaches: incomplete information (Levine, 1998) andintentionality (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Incompleteinformation is important because social preferences are not directly observable; intentions arefound to be indispensable in explaining behavior in games (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008). Inthe model it is assumed that the players have social attitudes that define their socialpreferences. In addition, players care differently about the payoffs of other players depending ontheir beliefs about their social attitude and possibly on the beliefs of higher orders. As thegame unfolds players update their beliefs about the types of other players. An action of a playershows intention when she chooses it anticipating future belief updating by others. A reasoningprocedure is proposed that allows players to understand how to update beliefs by constructing asequence of logical implications.

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    File URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:7d50109f-809b-464c-a595-90137d9e5d7e/datastreams/ASSET1/content
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    Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 015.

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    Date of creation: 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012015
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    1. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst & Nikolai Roussanov, 2007. "Conspicuous Consumption and Race," NBER Working Papers 13392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Discussion Paper 1998-37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter," IEW - Working Papers 063, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. McCabe, Kevin A. & Rigdon, Mary L. & Smith, Vernon L., 2003. "Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 267-275, October.
    6. James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental 0406001, EconWPA.
    7. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers 040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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