Pairwise interactive knowledge and Nash equilibrium
We provide epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, which are considerably weaker than thestandard ones by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). Indeed, we simultaneously replace commonknowledge of conjectures and mutual knowledge of rationality with strictly weaker epistemicconditions of pairwise common knowledge of conjectures and pairwise mutual knowledge ofrationality respectively. It is also shown that, unlike the Aumann and Brandenburger''s conditions,ours do not imply common knowledge of rationality. Surprisingly, they actually do not even implymutual knowledge of rationality.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +31 (0)43 38 83 830
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barelli, Paulo, 2009. "Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 363-375, November.
- Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014.
"Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,
in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charles Bollen)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.