IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Pairwise interactive knowledge and Nash equilibrium

  • Bach Christian W.
  • Tsakas Elias

    (METEOR)

Registered author(s):

    We provide epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, which are considerably weaker than thestandard ones by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). Indeed, we simultaneously replace commonknowledge of conjectures and mutual knowledge of rationality with strictly weaker epistemicconditions of pairwise common knowledge of conjectures and pairwise mutual knowledge ofrationality respectively. It is also shown that, unlike the Aumann and Brandenburger''s conditions,ours do not imply common knowledge of rationality. Surprisingly, they actually do not even implymutual knowledge of rationality.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:c3355ed3-b70a-4150-8cee-dc3908c6ecee/datastreams/ASSET1/content
    Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 401 Unauthorized. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Charles Bollen)


    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 008.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012008
    Contact details of provider: Postal: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht
    Phone: +31 (0)43 38 83 830
    Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
    2. Barelli, Paulo, 2009. "Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 363-375, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charles Bollen)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.