Symmetric Approximate Equilibrium Distributions with Finite Support
We show that a distribution of a game with a continuum of players is an equilibrium distribution if and only if there exists a sequence of symmetric approximate equilibrium distributions of games with fi- nite support that converges to it. Thus, although not all games have symmetric equilibrium distributions, this result shows that all equilibrium distributions can be characterized by symmetric distributions of simpler games (i.e., games with a finite number of characteristics).
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- Rath, Kali P. & Yeneng Sun & Shinji Yamashige, 1995. "The nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in anonymous games with compact action spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 331-346.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2003.
"Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players,"
Game Theory and Information
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp442, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- Green, Edward J, 1984. "Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 975-993, July.
- Green, Edward J., 1982. "Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition," Working Papers 418, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.