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Cooperative performance measurement proposal (a test with the cooperfic© tool for wine cooperatives in Languedoc-Roussillon)

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  • Saïsset, L.A.
  • Couderc, J.P.
  • Bou Saba, M.

Abstract

Purpose: French wine cooperatives show differences of corporate objectives, but also common ones with private wine merchants, as they face a common economic environment. The traditional controlling and financial models do not seem adequate to measure ‘sustainable social economy’ performances advocated by the cooperatives’ philosophy. The main difficulty is that their specific corporate governance introduces competition between short term maximum payments to their grape suppliers-patrons and long term investment potentials. How, therefore, facing this “cooperative dilemma”, should they balance these conflicting objectives, and which performance measurement specificities should wine cooperatives adopt? Design/methodology: In order to try and answer this question, the design of an adapted data base appears to be necessary. It should take into account the apparent antinomy of the cooperatives’ short term and long term objectives, in the context of an economically sustainable development. An original economic and financial measurement model is proposed, and we test it with COOPERFIC?, a decision-aid tool for wine cooperatives, based upon a specially constructed data base in Languedoc-Roussillon. Findings: The exploratory results obtained from the test of an original performance measurement model on an ad hoc sample of wine cooperatives lead to new insights into cooperative performance and to some useful guidelines in terms of cooperative governance. Results show how the conflict between their short term and long term performances could be balanced, in order for this specific type of firm to reach its economic and social objectives Practical implications: A conjoint short and long term economic indicators approach illustrates the necessary balance in the cooperative governance, and constitutes a performance measurement model answering some of these wine cooperatives’ Board and management questions ...French Abstract : Propos: Les caves coopératives françaises font apparaître des points de divergence, mais aussi de convergence avec les négociants en vin, en matière d’objectifs d’entreprise, dans la mesure où elles font face au même environnement économique. Toutefois, les modèles traditionnels financiers et de contrôle de gestion ne semblent pas adaptés à la mesure des performances d’une économie sociale durable, dont les valeurs sont portées par la philosophie coopérative. La principale difficulté réside dans le fait que leur mode de gouvernance spécifique entraîne un conflit permanent entre la rémunération maximale à court terme des vignerons coopérateurs et les capacités d’investissement à long terme. Aussi, face à ce « dilemme coopératif », comment les entreprises coopératives viticoles doivent-elles concilier ces objectifs conflictuels et quels types de mesures de performance spécifiques devraient-elles adopter ? Design/méthodologie: Afin d’arriver à répondre à cette double question, la conception d’une base de données spécifique apparaît nécessaire. Elle se doit de prendre en compte l’apparente antinomie des objectifs à court terme et à long terme des coopératives, dans le cadre d’un développement économique durable. Un modèle de mesure de performance économique et financière est ici proposé et testé à l’aide de l’outil d’aide à la décision COOPERFIC?, spécifique aux caves coopératives du Languedoc-Roussillon. Résultats: Les résultats exploratoires provenant du test d’un modèle original de mesure de la performance sur un échantillon ad hoc de caves coopératives conduit à de nouvelles perspectives en matière de performance coopérative, ainsi qu’à des conseils utiles ayant trait à la gouvernance. Ces résultats montrent la façon dont le conflit entre performances à court terme et à long terme pourrait être maîtrisé en vue d’atteindre les objectifs économiques et sociaux de ce type particulier d’entreprise. Implications managériales: Une approche conjointe des indicateurs économiques à court et long terme illustre le nécessaire équilibre à trouver en matière de gouvernance coopérative et constitue un modèle de mesure de la performance répondant à un certain nombre de questions relatives au conseil d’administration et au management général des coopératives.

Suggested Citation

  • Saïsset, L.A. & Couderc, J.P. & Bou Saba, M., 2011. "Cooperative performance measurement proposal (a test with the cooperfic© tool for wine cooperatives in Languedoc-Roussillon)," Working Papers MoISA 201104, UMR MoISA : Montpellier Interdisciplinary center on Sustainable Agri-food systems (social and nutritional sciences): CIHEAM-IAMM, CIRAD, INRAE, L'Institut Agro, Montpellier SupAgro, IRD - Montpellier, France.
  • Handle: RePEc:umr:wpaper:201104
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saïsset, L.A. & Couderc, J.P., 2013. "Les trois dimensions de la gouvernance coopérative : à la recherche d'un équilibre instable. Le cas des caves coopératives en Languedoc-Roussillon [France]," Working Papers MoISA 201302, UMR MoISA : Montpellier Interdisciplinary center on Sustainable Agri-food systems (social and nutritional sciences): CIHEAM-IAMM, CIRAD, INRAE, L'Institut Agro, Montpellier SupAgro, IRD - Montpellier, France.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    WINE COOPERATIVES; GOVERNANCE; PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT; INDICATORS; LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON; FRANCE;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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