IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/umc/wpaper/0307.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Race, Bureaucratic Discretion, and the Implementation of Welfare Reform

Author

Abstract

This paper explores the impact of the race of individual clients and of the local racial context on the implementation of sanctions for recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in a Midwestern state. We find that although nonwhites are sanctioned at lower rates than whites overall, nonwhites are sanctioned more compared to whites in each local area. This paradox occurs because nonwhites tend to live in areas with lower sanction rates. Consistent with the literature on race and policy, we find that sanction rates increase as the nonwhite population increases until a threshold is reached where nonwhites gain political power.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter R. Mueser & Lael R. Keiser & Carolyn J. Heinrich, 2003. "Race, Bureaucratic Discretion, and the Implementation of Welfare Reform," Working Papers 0307, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  • Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0307
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2003/wp0307-mueser.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:02:p:334-347_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Peter R. Mueser & Kenneth Troske & William J. Carrington, 2002. "The Impact of Welfare Reform on Leaver Characteristics, Employment and Recidivism," Working Papers 0205, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 26 Aug 2002.
    3. Orr, Larry L, 1976. "Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application to AFDC," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 359-371, June.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:01:p:23-33_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Lieberman, Robert C. & Lapinski, John S., 2001. "American Federalism, Race and the Administration of Welfare," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(02), pages 303-329, April.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:04:p:1249-1270_18 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Oscar Mitnik, 2008. "How do Training Programs Assign Participants to Training? Characterizing the Assignment Rules of Government Agencies for Welfare-to-Work Programs in California," Working Papers 0907, University of Miami, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • J78 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Public Policy (including comparable worth)

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valerie Kulp). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/edumous.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.