IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ulb/ulbeco/2013-151693.html

Regulating School Choice in Brussels

Author

Listed:
  • Estelle Cantillon

Abstract

This article aims to contribute to the current debate on the optimal regulation of school choice in the Brussels Capital Region. We first summarize the current regulatory framework and make the distinction between the political objectives pursued by the regulation of school choice, and the procedure that implements these objectives. We argue that these two aspects can be analyzed separately. We then describe the specific challenges that the Region faces as far as school choice is concerned. Next, we analyze two scenarios consisting of a set of political objectives for school choice regulation in Brussels and a possible ranking among those. These political objectives echo some of the objectives for school choice regulation mentioned in the public debate but are tailored to the specific needs of the Region. Finally, we describe a procedure that implements these objectives. The exercise illustrates the type of arbitrage public decision makers need to make and several key practical aspects of the implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Estelle Cantillon, 2009. "Regulating School Choice in Brussels," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/151693, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/151693
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/151693/1/Cantillon-Brussels-Studies-2009-final.pdf
    File Function: Cantillon-Brussels-Studies-2009-final
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. François Maniquet, 2009. "Inscriptions dans les écoles : quelques enjeux et quelques solutions," Regards économiques 70, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," NBER Working Papers 11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2012. "Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference : Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche 15-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Kesten, Onur & Unver, Utku, 2015. "A theory of school choice lotteries," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    4. Caterina Calsamiglia & Chao Fu & Maia Güell, 2014. "Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives," Working Papers 2014-21, FEDEA.
    5. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    6. Dur, Umut Mert & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "What you don't know can help you in school assignment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 246-256.
    7. Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan, 2020. "Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 1-21.
    8. Chen, Yan & Jiang, Ming & Kesten, Onur & Robin, Stéphane & Zhu, Min, 2018. "Matching in the large: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 295-317.
    9. Kaire Põder & Triin Lauri, 2014. "Will Choice Hurt? Compared to What? School Choice Experiment in Estonia," TUT Economic Research Series 11, Department of Finance and Economics, Tallinn University of Technology.
    10. Morrill, Thayer & Roth, Alvin E., 2024. "Top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    11. Harless, Patrick, 2014. "A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance," MPRA Paper 61417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    13. Maxey, Tyler, 2024. "School choice with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 248-268.
    14. Kojima, Fuhito & Tamura, Akihisa & Yokoo, Makoto, 2018. "Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 803-833.
    15. Mennle, Timo & Seuken, Sven, 2021. "Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    16. Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2010. "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1860-1874, September.
    17. Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, August.
    18. Alcalde, Jose & Subiza, Begoña, 2011. "On Integration Policies and Schooling," MPRA Paper 29145, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 198-237.
    20. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 669-689, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/151693. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsulbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.